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The CEO shouldn’t hold the keys to the kingdom

Tristan Shortland, Chief Technology Officer, Infinity Group

By Tristan Shortland, Chief Technology Officer, Infinity Group

When businesses think about cybersecurity threats, they tend to focus on external attackers, vulnerable systems or employees clicking on suspicious links. But there’s another risk that doesn’t always get the attention it deserves: the amount of access and authority concentrated in the hands of senior executives.

A CEO or board member is an attractive target for a cybercriminal, and not simply because of the information they can access. Senior executives also have the authority to make decisions, approve transactions and influence the behaviour of other employees. In the wrong hands, that combination can be extremely damaging.

Yet many businesses still treat seniority as a reason to grant broader access to systems and information. That’s a mistake. The reality is that anyone can have their credentials stolen, fall victim to social engineering or have their account compromised. Being at the top of an organisation doesn’t make someone immune to cyber threats. If anything, their position makes them a more valuable target. The question businesses need to consider is what happens if that individual is compromised.

Seniority shouldn’t mean unlimited access

One of the most important principles in cybersecurity is least privilege. Put simply, people should only have access to the systems and information they need to do their jobs and that should apply to everyone, including the CEO. A senior executive may need access to commercially sensitive information, financial reports or strategic plans, but that doesn’t mean they should automatically have permanent access to every critical system in the business. It’s worth looking at how much access senior leaders actually have and whether all of it is necessary.

In many organisations, permissions accumulate over time. Someone changes roles, takes on additional responsibilities or receives access to a system for a particular project. That access isn’t always removed when it’s no longer needed.

For senior executives, the problem can be even greater because their authority is rarely questioned.

Businesses should be separating administrative privileges from everyday accounts and restricting access to sensitive systems wherever possible. Just-in-time access is another useful safeguard. Rather than allowing someone to retain elevated permissions indefinitely, access can be granted for a particular task and removed afterwards. It’s a relatively straightforward principle, but one that can make a significant difference

 if an account is compromised.

A convincing email isn’t the only threat

Security awareness training is important, but businesses can’t rely on people recognising every suspicious email or attempted scam. Attackers are becoming increasingly convincing, and senior executives are particularly exposed to targeted social engineering. An attacker doesn’t necessarily need to break through a company’s technical defences if they can persuade someone with authority to approve a payment, share sensitive information or provide access to a system.

That’s why identity security needs to go beyond passwords. Phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, device compliance checks and conditional access policies can all help prevent stolen credentials from being used. But there’s another issue here. Even when someone is legitimately signed in, should they be able to carry out every sensitive action without anyone else being involved?

For major financial transactions, changes to critical security settings or the extraction of particularly sensitive data, there should be additional checks. Requiring a second person to approve certain actions isn’t about questioning an executive’s judgement. It’s about recognising that no single individual should be able to put the entire organisation at risk.

Would anyone notice if something went wrong?

Access controls are only part of the picture. Businesses also need to understand how accounts are being used. If a senior executive suddenly starts downloading large volumes of information, accessing systems they’ve never used before or signing in from an unexpected location, would anyone notice? And perhaps more importantly, would anyone feel comfortable challenging it?

This is where the culture of an organisation matters just as much as its technology. Security teams need to be able to investigate unusual activity regardless of whose account is involved. A CEO’s account shouldn’t be exempt from scrutiny simply because of their position.

The same applies to attempts to elevate privileges or access information outside someone’s normal responsibilities. Monitoring these activities doesn’t mean treating senior executives as suspects. It means applying consistent security standards across the business.

After all, an attacker using a compromised executive account may appear to be a legitimate user. Without appropriate monitoring, suspicious activity could go unnoticed until significant damage has already been done.

Security shouldn’t depend on one person’s behaviour

When a security incident involves a senior figure, attention often turns to the individual’s actions and how they came to be compromised. While that’s understandable,

it can overlook a much bigger problem: the level of access and authority that allowed a single account to put the organisation at risk. No organisation can guarantee that an employee, executive or board member will never be compromised. What matters is having the right safeguards in place to limit the damage when it happens.

When a security incident involves a senior figure, attention often turns to the individual, how they were targeted and whether they could have done anything differently. While these are reasonable considerations, they can distract from a more fundamental problem: why the compromise of a single account could expose an entire organisation to significant risk. No business can guarantee that an employee, executive or board member will never be compromised. People make mistakes, attackers continually develop new tactics and even the most carefully protected accounts can be breached.

What businesses can control is how much damage a compromise can cause. That means limiting unnecessary access, introducing additional approval processes for sensitive actions and making sure unusual behaviour can be identified and investigated quickly.

It also means recognising that security policies need to apply consistently, regardless of someone’s seniority. The objective isn’t to make executives’ jobs more difficult. It’s to protect the business without depending on any one individual to get everything right, every time. Because if compromising a single executive gives an attacker unrestricted access to critical systems and sensitive information, the biggest problem isn’t necessarily the person who was targeted. It’s the way the organisation’s security was designed.

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